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ARTICLE

LANGUAGE AND SILENCE: THE SUPREME
COURT'S SEARCH FOR THE MEANING OF
AMERICAN DENATURALIZATION LAW
MICHAEL HEYMAN*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Statelessness is abhorrent.' Even though stateless people may enjoy
some rights and freedoms,' many elude them. Stateless people stand at
the edge of society, not within it. Dissociated from the community
before them, they are part of no community at all. Fortunately, only a
few aliens are stateless even though they do not enjoy the benefits of
full membership in our polity.3
Under American law, permanent resident aliens cannot vote; nor can
they hold an American passport, or most political offices. Employment
opportunities available to them are similarly limited. 4 Still, permanent
* Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School. The author wishes to acknowledge Professor George Steiner for his provocative title. See GEORGE STEINER. LANGUAGE AND SILENCE:

(1967). However, whereas Steiner describes the sublime non-verbal meanings that exist beyond language, the silence discussed here is
abject silence; legislative inattentiveness. Here, the Court defines itself by the way it fills in this
silence with meaning.
ESSAYS ON LANGUAGE, LITERATURE, AND THE INHUMAN

1. The problem has been summed up as follows:
The calamity of the rightless is not that they are deprived of life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness, or of equality before the law and freedom of opinion-formulas
which were designed to solve problems within given communities-but that they no
longer belong to any community whatsoever. Their plight is not that they are not
equal before the law, but that no law exists for them; not that they are oppressed but
that nobody wants even to oppress them.
HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 293 (1951) (emphasis in original). For a
view critical of the importance society legally places on citizenship, see ALEXANDER M. BICKEL,
THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 53-54 (1975).
2. Clearly, not all aliens are stateless. Indeed, statelessness is most rare. However, this Article
focuses on those aliens who are stateless and lack full membership rights.
3. In a recent article, Professor T. Alexander Aleinikoff argued for a reconceptualization of
immigration power that greatly depended on the notion of full membership in the national community. T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, CITIZENS, ALIENS, MEMBERSHIP AND THE CONSTITUTION, 7
CONST. COMMENTARY 9 (1990).

4.

CHARLES GORDON

& STANLEY MAILMAN, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE
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resident aliens can be deported. Yet, these aliens remain citizens somewhere, often in their native land and, therefore, have a homeland to
which they may return. Stateless aliens, on the other hand, do not enjoy citizenship anywhere, and are therefore without a homeland.
Thus, one would expect statelessness to be a discouraged condition,
not easily attained. This is generally true.5 United States' citizens lose
citizenship through only two means: (1) voluntary expatriation and (2)
denaturalization. Moreover, only a naturalized citizen can be
denaturalized, a rare proceeding. Still, one would also expect our legal
system to jealously protect United States citizenship through both its
legislation and decisional law. Sadly, this expectation has been only
partially realized.
Denaturalization legislation in the United States is strangely sparse
and virtually silent on critical issues. It thus creates only vague standards for assertion of this power. To make matters worse, the Supreme
Court has been inconsistently protective of citizenship, having taken an
odd turn in its interpretation of the governing statutes. Perhaps this has
been driven by the types of denaturalization cases it has taken recently
which involve, for the most part, war criminals or suspected war
criminals. Nevertheless, the naturalized citizen, as of late, has fared
poorly in the Court.
This essay will examine this phenomenon of a vague statute and Supreme Court opinions which afford little protection to the alien facing
denaturalization. First, it will explain the relevant statutory law and
elucidate the substantive and evidentiary burdens borne by the government. It will then analyze the major denaturalization cases of the recent decades, exploring their ambiguities and difficulties. The essay will
focus squarely on the Court's latest decision, Kungys v. United States,'
and examine closely the methodology by which the Court reformulated
the law of denaturalization. In doing so, this section will focus on the
form of statutory interpretation used by the Court and conclude that
the Court, locked into a mechanical form of statutory interpretation,
failed to vindicate the critical values at stake. The section will make
clear that the Court failed to recognize that a discussion of values is
vital to meaningful, effective discourse in this area. Although this oversight is understandable, it is nonetheless unfortunate. Finally, this essay
will recommend that Congress change the relevant statutes to provide
clarity and wisdom in an area riddled with problems.
(Supp. 1990) (discussion of alienage).
5. GORDON & MAILMAN, supra note 4, at §11 .3e (discussion of statelessness).
6. 485 U.S. 759 (1988).
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II.

THE STATUTORY BASIS FOR DENATURALIZATION

Although denaturalization may proceed through one of various avenues, the chief basis for denaturalization lies in section 340(a) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).' A naturalized citizen may
be denaturalized if the citizenship was "illegally procured or [was] procured by concealment of a material fact or by willful misrepresentation."' The burden squarely falls on the government to prove its case
by "clear, unequivocal, and convincing" evidence. 9 Unfortunately, although the evidentiary burden is clear, it is far less clear just what the
government must prove.
Interpreted literally, a misrepresentation, in order to form the basis
for revocation of citizenship under the statute, need only be willful, not
also material. Yet this strict interpretation has been rejected. 10 On its
face, the term "illegally procured" seems to invite tautology, providing
no standard for denaturalization. It appears to stand simply for the
proposition that any illegality involved in the procurement renders the
citizenship illegal, thus forfeitable. Until recently, this did not pose a
serious problem. However, the Court's decision in Kungys changed
that.
The provision relating to the concealment of a material fact is of
paramount concern since it has engendered considerable controversy
and has been the focus of frequent litigation. The obvious question has
been, "What does material mean?" Does it bear an evidentiary meaning, denoting something of importance? Does it more likely signal the
notion that the citizen concealed a fact which, if revealed, would have
disqualified him for citizenship? If the latter view is adopted, "material" plainly means disqualifying. However, if Congress intended that
meaning, it could easily have said so, instead of using the word
"material."
These problems have plagued the courts. Strikingly, for thirty years,
case law has been awash in disagreement, not with a convoluted section
or a controversial policy, but with the meaning of the word "material."
Yet, only recently, in Kungys, did the Court definitively gloss that
term. Unfortunately, rather than clarifying matters, Kungys compounded the problem immeasurably. To understand fully the enormity
of the problem, one must trudge back to the first Supreme Court case
that attacked this problem, a case as striking for its opacity as Kungys
is for its confusion.
7. Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 477, § 340(a), 66 Stat. 163, 260 (1952), codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (1988) [hereinafter INA].
8. Id.

9. Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 135 (1943).
10. Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 507 (1981). For a discussion of the United
States' use of war criminals during the Cold War era, see infra note 31.
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CHAUNT AND COSTELLO

Chaunt v. United States1 was decided under a somewhat different
statute from the current one. When Chaunt was decided, there was no
provision for the revocation of citizenship because of illegal procurement. Citizenship was revocable only upon a showing of willful misrepresentation or concealment of a material fact. However, concealment
undoubtedly took place.
Chaunt was admitted to citizenship in 1940, after having been in the
United States since at least the late 1920s. When he applied for citizenship, he was asked whether he had ever been "arrested or charged
with violation of any law of the United States or State or any city
ordinance or traffic regulation." 2 Chaunt replied that he had not. Yet,
he had been arrested three times for violating the laws of New Haven,
Connecticut, regarding, inter alia, the distribution of leaflets and public
orations. None of these arrests had remotely serious criminal
consequences.
For naturalization purposes, however, Chaunt's Connecticut arrests
may have had a particular significance, for, as the government claimed,
had he disclosed the arrests, an investigation would have followed and
the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) could have discovered that Chaunt was a district organizer of the Communist Party in
Connecticut, a fact which was presumably relevant to his qualifications
for citizenship. Thus, if his political affiliations were relevant to his
qualifications for citizenship, the government's argument seems compelling. Moreover, the very fact that Chaunt lied about the arrests
seemed to negate good moral character, a prerequisite for citizenship.1 3
However, this was not the law at the time. Under the prevailing law,
the government had to prove concealment of a material fact, not the
forestalling of an investigation.
As one journeys through the points and counterpoints of the case,
one keeps returning to the question of just what was-or what might
have been-so wrong with Chaunt's conduct as to justify denaturalization. The Court's majority concluded that no basis for denaturalization
existed. It observed that, even if Chaunt's communist connections were
relevant, he had revealed them elsewhere in his application for naturalization, including his membership in the International Workers' Order,
an organization said to have been communist controlled. Thus, in the
majority's view, any concealment was otherwise neutralized by
Chaunt's inclusion, in his application for naturalization, information
11. 364 U.S. 350 (1960).
12. Id. at 351.
13. It should be noted, however, that the government could not argue that the citizenship was
"illegally procured" because the law contained no such provision. Thus, the Court's position was
somewhat peculiar, for it was never clear precisely which qualification for citizenship was at issue.
HeinOnline -- 5 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 412 1991
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concerning his communist affiliation.
Assuming, then, that communist membership, in itself, was not dis-

qualifying and that concealment of that fact lacked telling, independent
significance, none of the majority's views seems exceptional. However,

in the penultimate paragraph of its opinion, the Court did something
truly exceptional: it enunciated a two-part test for determining materiality.1 Under this test, the government fails to establish the materiality

of factual omissions if it is unable to prove either "(1) that facts were
suppressed which, if known, would have warranted denial of citizenship, or (2) that their disclosure might have been useful in an investigation possibly leading to the discovery of other facts warranting denial
of citizenship."1 5
Although debate over this language has become wearisome," the
ambiguity is manifest. The first prong of the test is clear, but the second prong is susceptible to two interpretations. Two schools of thought
have emerged from the ongoing debate over the meaning of the second
prong of the Chaunt test. In one "camp" are those who believe that
materiality is proven if the government can demonstrate that the citizen forestalled what might have been a promising investigation. Thus,
proponents of that interpretation urge that the test can have significance only if the government need only prove the forestalling of a potentially damning investigation. If the government must also prove the
disqualifying facts, this test is redundant. 7
14. The characterization of this test is itself controversial. Indeed, some commentators have
suggested that both prongs of the test are merely different ways of asking the same question: was
the citizen unqualified for citizenship?
15. Chaunt, 364 U.S. at 355 (emphasis added).
16. The language used by the Supreme Court in Chaunt spawned much debate. See, e.g.,
ELLIOT M. ABRAMSON, Reflection of the Unthinkable: Standards Relating to the Denaturalization and Deportation of Nazis and Those Who Collaborated With the Nazis During World War
11, 57 U. CN. L. REV. 1311 (1989) (examination of individualized guilt and the social cost of
retaining a person within the community no matter how negligible the participation); SHARI B.
GERSTEN, Note, United States v. Kungys: Clarifying the Materiality Standard in Denaturalization Proceedings?, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 429 (1989) (discussion of confusion created under Kungys
opinion); STEVEN S. GOODMAN, Note, Protecting Citizenship: Strengthening the Intent Requirement in Expatriation Proceedings, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 341 (1988) (discussion of Court's
inability to define "intent"); STEPHEN J.MASSEY, Individual Responsibility for Assisting the Nazis in Persecuting Civilians, 71 MINN. L. REV. 97 (1986) (discussion of unpredictable and inconsistent treatment of war criminals); MATTHEw E. STEINMETZ, Note, Judicial Abatement of the
Materiality Requirement in Denaturalization Proceedings: Eroding the Valued Rights of Citizenship, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 777 (1986) (discussion of present state of denaturalization law
upon persons admitted under Displaced Persons Act); MONROE LEIGH, Judicial Decisions, 75 AM.
J.INT'L. L. 669 (1981) (synopsis of Chaunt and discussion of denaturalization process on basis of
illegal procurement); ALONA E. EVANS, Judicial Decisions, 74 Am. J. INT'L. L. 186 (1980) (discussion of United States v. Fedorenko, 597 F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1979) and its affect on the denaturalization process).
17. Moreover, proponents argue that this is a sensible policy, since evidence disappears and
memories fade over the years. Were this not the test, they maintain, there would be an unfortunate and compelling incentive to lie. See, e.g., KRISTIN E. HENNES, Comment, Concealment of
Facts and Forestalling an Investigation in Denaturalization Proceeding, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 588
(1980).
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Those in the second "camp" find this view nonsensical. Reminding us
that the government should only denaturalize those who were ineligible
for naturalization, proponents argue that part two of the Chaunt test is
simply another way of asking whether citizenship should have been denied initially. They argue that the test is expressed in the disjunctive
only .because a concealment may, ipso facto, seem innocuous, but may
lead to the disclosure of other facts that would have been disqualifying.
For example, although Chaunt's Connecticut arrests were not material,
his party membership was potentially material. Thus, if the Chaunt
test did not have this second prong, denaturalization could be thwarted
by complex layers of prevarications and facts.
Shortly after Chaunt was decided, Congress changed the law to include illegal procurement as a basis for denaturalization, 18 but that did
not settle the controversy, fueled in part by the belief that one who
conceals the truth is unworthy of citizenship. Though this moral tone
has long hovered over the debate,19 it has become more prominent and
strident in recent decisions.
Indeed, in the next term immediately following the Chaunt decision,
the Court decided a denaturalization case20 involving a citizen who had
been less than fully candid on his naturalization application. In his application for naturalization, Frank Costello swore that his occupation
was real estate, when, according to the District Court, "his true occupation was bootlegging." 1 Since Costello was naturalized in 1925, during Prohibition, when federal law proscribed the manufacture, sale, or
transportation of alcoholic beverages in the United States,2 2 the Court
concluded that a known bootlegger probably would not have been naturalized had he told the truth, since he "did not meet the statutory criterion that an applicant must have behaved as a person 'of good moral
character, attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United
States, and well disposed to the good order and happiness of the
same.' "23 Implicitly, the Court was saying that a party has willfully
18. INA §18(a), 75 Stat. 655 (1961), codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (1970). The
1961 amendment to the INA added illegal procurement as a basis for denaturalization. Id.
19. To the dissenters in Chaunt, the government had a right to expect honest answers from
applicants for citizenship. Chaunt, 364 U.S. at 360. Justice Clark, writing for the dissenters,
noted:
We should exact the highest standards of probity and fitness from all applicants. American
citizenship is a valuable right. It is prized highly by us who have it and is sought eagerly by
millions who do not. It is asking little enough of those who would be vested with its privileges to demand that they tell the truth.

Id.
20. Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265 (1961).
21. Id. at 267.
22. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
23. Id. at 270 (citing Act of 1906, Act of June 29, 1906 ch. 3592, § 4, 34 Stat. 596, 598,
current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1427 (a)(3) (West Supp. 1991)).
HeinOnline -- 5 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 414 1991
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misrepresented or concealed a material fact if honest disclosure would
have revealed the absence of good moral character. Yet, however important moral probity is for citizenship, it is unclear just what fact Costello had concealed or misrepresented which made his citizenship
revocable.
The Court was obviously walking a narrow, if existent, line between
revocation based on the absence of good moral character24 and revocation based on the concealment of a fact which, if revealed, would have
rendered the applicant ineligible for citizenship. 25 This confusion, even
conflation, of standards has plagued the Court's opinions throughout
these cases. Justice Douglas, the author of Chaunt, dissented, denying
that bootlegging per se could possibly have been a ground for denying
naturalization. 26 Nevertheless, the Court was obviously injecting a
moral note into an area that warranted moral analysis (indeed has a
moral component) but required guidance by statutory criteria and precise standards, lest these decisions be little better than a jumble of ad
hoc moral posturings.
Chaunt and Costello, though doctrinally important, lacked the emotional impact of cases yet to come. It mattered little, or so one might
think, whether a former communist retained his citizenship, or whether
crime figure Frank Costello was stripped of citizenship. What did matter was how the United States defined itself by its treatment of suspected-or actual-war criminals. Many thought the United States
impermissibly slow in its legal reaction to former war criminals in its
midst, and the cases of Demjanjuk,27 Walus,28 Linnas29 and others
drew national attention. However, the first case to reach the Supreme
Court on the merits was that of Feodor Fedorenko.

IV.

FEDORENKO AND THE PURSUIT OF NAZI WAR CRIMINALS

Despite the drama surrounding the trials at Nuremberg, suspicions
ran high thereafter that numerous Nazis were living here in the United
States, seemingly free from any fear of detection and expulsion. Many
24.

At the time of Costello, illegal procurement was not yet a basis for denaturalization. This

makes the Court's posturing all the more odd.
25. One commentator noted that Costello is faithful to neither of Chaunt's tests, because the
true facts were neither per se disqualifying nor had the government demonstrated that its revelation would have prompted an investigation. MICHAEL WOLF, Fraud and Materiality: Has the
Supreme Court Redefined Immigration and Naturalization Fraud?, 62 TEMP. L. REv. 481, 512

(1989).
26. Costello, 365 U.S. at 288-89 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
27. United States v. Demjanjuk. 518 F. Supp. 1362 (N.D. Ohio 1981), affd, Demjanjuk v.
United States, 680 F.2d 32 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1036 (1982). See also
Demjanjuk v. United States, 767 F.2d 922 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1034 (1985).
28. United States v. Walus, 453 F. Supp. 699 (N.D. Ill. 1978), rev'd, 616 F.2d 283 (7th Cir.
1980).
29. United States v. Linnas, 527 F. Supp. 426 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), affid, United States v. Linnas, 685 F.2d 427 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 883 (1982).
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felt that these "quiet neighbors" 0 led lives of unrelinquished insignificance with seeming impunity. Thus, despite its noble declarations following World War II, the United States did little to expel these
criminals from its shores.3 1 Two events changed that dramatically: the
amendment of the Immigration and Nationality Act in 19782 and the
establishment of the Office of Special Investigations within the Department of Justice.
The passage of the Holtzman Amendment3 3 precluded the admission
of former war criminals into the United States and provided for their
deportation. 4 Though some claimed that this amendment created the
specter of an ex post facto law,3 5 such claims were unavailing. Thus,
former war criminals were excludable and deportable. Besides, they
seemed susceptible to denaturalization under the scheme previously
discussed.3 6
Indeed, one year after the passage of these amendments, former Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti provided for the creation of the Office of Special Investigations (OSI) within the Criminal Division of the
Department of Justice.37 Because of the work of OSI, Feodor
Fedorenko was eventually brought to trial. This proceeding ultimately
resulted in his denaturalization and deportation to the Soviet Union
where he was subsequently executed. When the case began, many
30. See ALLAN A. RYAN, JR., QUIET NEIGHBORS: PROSECUTING NAZI WAR CRIMINALS IN
AMERICA 1 (1984).

31. The United States, along with France, the United .Kingdom, and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics signed the London Agreement "for the Prosecution and Punishment of the
Major War Criminals of the European Axis," 8 August 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, E.A.S. No. 472.
However, the fact remains that the United States probably knew of the presence of Nazi's here,
and unquestionably made use of them during the Cold War era. The employment of Klaus Barbie,
"the butcher of Lyon," by our army's Counter-Intelligence Corps in Bolivia between 1947 and
1951 was not only known but defended. See generally ALLAN A. RYAN, JR., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, KLAUS BARBIE AND THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT: A REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GEN-

(1983).
32. See INA § 241 (a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (a)(19), amended by Immigration Act of 1990 §
544, Pub. L. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (West Supp. 1991).
33.. Id. This amendment is named the Holtzman Amendment after its sponsor, former Congresswoman, Elizabeth Holtzman.
34. See INA §§ 2 12 (a)(33) and 241(a)(19), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(33) and 8 U.S.C. §
1251(a)(19) (West Supp. 1990), as amended by Immigration Act of 1990 § 601.
35. For a discussion of this claim, see NORINE M. WINICKI, Comment, The Denaturalization
and Deportationof Nazi Criminals.:Is it Constitutional?, 11 Loy. L. A. INT'L & COMP. L. J. 117,
132 (1989).
36. They could be denaturalized had they gained entry to the United States through deceptions, and, as will be explained below, their admissions to citizenship were traceable to the misrepresentations or concealments of material facts.
37. Order of the Attorney General, Transfer of Functions of the Special Litigation Unit
Within the Immigration and NaturalizationService of the Department of Justice to the Criminal
Division of the Department of Justice, No.851-79, Sept. 4, 1979. In a more recent development,
on October 19, 1989, Richard Thornburgh and Alexander Sukharev signed, in Moscow, a Memorandum of Understanding Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Office of the Procurator General and the United States Department of Justice Concerning Cooperation in the Pursuit
of Nazi War Criminals. See MARIAN NASH LEICH, Contemporary Practice of the United States
Relating to International Law, 84 AM. J.INT'L. L. 536 (1990).
ERAL OF THE UNITED STATES
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hoped that the Court would resolve the growing conflict among the circuits as to the meaning of Chaunt. s That was not to be, for the Court
took an unexpected track in deciding the case.39
Feodor Fedorenko applied for admission to the United States in 1949
as a displaced person .4 ° At that time, he lied about his activities to
investigators from the Displaced Persons Commission." 1 Though he had
served as an armed guard at the concentration camp in Treblinka, Poland, he claimed to have been deported to Germany and forced to work
at a factory until the conclusion of the war.4 2 He was granted a visa
and admitted to permanent residence in 1949.
In 1969 Fedorenko applied for United States citizenship but concealed his wartime activities from the INS.4 His petition was granted,
and he became an American citizen in 1970." Seven years later, the
government brought suit against him, claiming, as was customary, that
he illegally procured his citizenship and willfully misrepresented or
concealed material facts in his application for naturalization. In short,
the government claimed that Fedorenko had illegally procured both his
visa and his citizenship.
As might have been expected, the lower courts disagreed on the government's claims. Construing the Chaunt test to require actual proof of
ineligibility, the District Court found for petitioner.' 5 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, finding that Fedorenko had foreclosed an investigation that might have led to the discovery of facts
which might have resulted in the denial of his visa petition. 4 ' The Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit on other grounds, thereby leaving many of the difficulties posed by Chaunt unresolved and many observers dissatisfied.
Though the Court discussed the differences over the meaning of
Chaunt,'I it proceeded, nonetheless, to avoid confronting them
squarely. Instead, it took the seemingly straightforward, logical view:
38. That is, the courts wrangled over whether Chaunt signaled two standards or one. Indeed,
they even disagreed about the likelihood that the concealed facts would have led to a further and
disqualifying investigation. While some have argued that the standard was "possibility," others
maintained the it was "probability." See generally, WOLF, supra note 25.
39. Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490 (1981).
40. Id.
41. The Displaced Persons Commission (DPC) was established pursuant to the Displaced Persons Act (DPA). Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 647, 62 Stat. 1009 (1948). The DPA "enable[d]
European refugees driven from their homelands by ... [World War II] to emigrate to the United
States without regard to traditional immigration quotas." Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 495. The DPC
was established "to oversee and administer the resettlement program envisaged" by the DPA. Id.
at 496 n.6.
42. Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 494, 496-97.
43. Id. at 497.
44. Id.
45. United States v. Fedorenko, 455 F. Supp. 893, 916 (S.D. Fla. 1978).
46. United States v. Fedorenko, 597 F.2d 946, 953 (5th Cir. 1979).
47. Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. at 508-09.
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Since Fedorenko had procured his visa illegally, the citizenship that
flowed from his permanent resident status was also illegal. 48 Therefore,
since he did not have a valid unexpired visa at the time of naturalization, his citizenship was revoked because it was procured illegally.
This approach ignited something of a firestorm within the Court, for
several Justices clearly wanted to see the Chaunt problem resolved.
Justice Blackmun, who concurred in the Court's judgment, wrote separately to underscore that Chaunt signaled but one standard: It merely
asked, albeit in different ways, whether the citizen was ineligible.4 9
Two Justices who later played an important role in Kungys v. United
States" dissented in Fedorenko. Justice White thought that the inquiry
should have been into Fedorenko's deceit at the time he applied for
citizenship, not at the visa stage.51 However, he was troubled by the
possibility that the materiality requirement would compel the government to prove the ultimately disqualifying facts. Thus, turning to the
District Court's definition of materiality, Justice White noted that
"[t]his definition of 'materiality,' by greatly improving the odds that
concealment would be successful, would encourage applicants to withhold information, since the Government would often be unable to meet
its burden by the time the concealment was discovered." 52
Justice Stevens, the other dissenter, expressed the view that the
Court had misinterpreted the Displaced Persons Act"3 by finding that
even involuntary service (as Fedorenko claimed his was) barred the
lawful issuance of a visa.54 Stevens insisted that whether it was at the
visa stage or the citizenship stage, the government had to prove that a
"disqualifying circumstance actually existed. ' 6 Indeed, for him "[t]he
story of this litigation is depressing." 56 That view was not to change
seven years later when the Court again addressed these issues. No
doubt, the Court's refusal to decide the Chaunt issue definitively was
particularly unsatisfying. The Court had failed to interpret the crucial
term "material," thereby potentially exposing many unsuspecting citizens to denaturalization.
Although the Court took an important step in Fedorenko on the issue of illegal procurement, its failure to resolve Chaunt was troubling,
as was the logic of the opinion. In the Court's view, any illegality
involved in the path from alien status to citizenship could vitiate the
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 514-15.
Id. at 518-526.
485 U.S. 759 (1988).
Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 526-30.
Id. at 529.
DPA, Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 647, 62 Stat. 1009 (1948).
Fedorenko, 499 U.S. at 530-538.

55. Id. at 537.
56. Id. at 530.
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citizenship and thus render it revocable.17 This was true, said the
Court, so long as "the true facts would have made the applicant ineligible for a visa. ' ' 8 This view could erode, if not eviscerate, the core of
section 340(a) of the INA, for illegal procurement could easily be used

as a substitute for the potentially more rigorous test of misrepresentation or concealment in ways not easily foreseen in 1981.
V.

KUNGYS

V. UNITED STATES69

If any doubt remained that the Court might dramatically change the
face of denaturalization, it was laid to rest by the odd procedural history of this case. The case was argued originally on April 27, 1987.
Yet, two months later, the Court restored the case to the calendar for
re-argument, directing the parties to file supplemental briefs addressing
several questions apparently left unanswered by the prior briefs and
arguments. Specifically, the Court required the parties to address two
issues: whether denaturalization could be based on absence of good
moral character, and whether the "false testimony" establishing that
lack of good moral character need concern a material fact.60 In addition, the Court invited discussion on whether Chaunt's test for materiality should be abandoned and, if so, what standard should govern materiality under section 340(a).6 ' Thus, the manner in which the Court
restored this case clearly showed its inclination to reconsider Chaunt,
an understandable reaction considering its obscurity and its disturbing
facts. Moreover, the passage of time inevitably worked to the advantage of the naturalized citizen and posed a substantial obstacle to the
government.
Juozas Kungys applied for a non-preference quota immigration visa
in Stuttgart, Germany in 1947.62 He obtained a visa in 1948 and became a naturalized citizen in 1954.63 At both the visa and naturalization stages, Kungys provided false birth records by listing a false date
and place of birth. Kungys also made false statements about his occupation and provided falsified records of his residence between 1939 and
August 28, 1941.64

Kungys' deceit as to his residence and occupation is especially troubling, since the government did not pursue Kungys because of his deceit
per se but because of his suspected participation in wartime atrocities.
On August 28, 1941, the town of Kedainiai in Lithuania had a popula57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 509.
Id.
485 U.S. 759 (1988).
Id. at 766.
Kungys v. United States, 483 U.S. 1017, 1018 (1987).
Kungys, 485 U.S. at 764.
Id.
United States v. Kungys, 571 F. Supp. 1104, 1107 (D.N.J. 1983).
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tion of about 8,500 people, of whom approximately 2,500 were Jewish.65 Shortly after the Nazi's invasion, local men were grouped in civilian auxiliary detachments to assist the police. On August 28, these
civilian detachments, along with local workers, ordered the people of
Kedainiai to assemble to be taken to their place of execution nearby.66
Nazi records recite the killing of 710 Jewish men, 767 Jewish women,
and 599 Jewish children in Kedainiai on that day. 7 Kungys allegedly
participated in those mass executions. His deceit may have simply covered up his participation in these atrocities.
OSI and the Soviet Union investigated these atrocities and discovered several witnesses. Their depositions were taken on videotape in the
Soviet Union for use in this case. These depositions were conducted in
the presence of a Soviet Procurator, and the evidence was excluded by
the District Court in this case because the judge thought that, due to
an overzealous investigation, the evidence was unreliable.68 However,
he also noted that the deponents' testimony, if believed, "would be
strong evidence of the truth of the government's charges that defendant
was an active participant in the killing." 69
In the end, the District Court judge admitted this evidence only to
prove that the atrocities took place, not to establish Kungys' complicity. 70 The judge concluded that, under Chaunt, Kungys had not misrepresented or concealed a material fact.7 1 Accordingly, the judge ruled
against the government. The Third Circuit reversed for reasons not relevant to this essay. 7 2 Thus, when the case came before the Court, the
Justices did not sit in judgment of a known war criminal, but only a
known liar. Limited by the statute to be interpreted, unaided by any
usable facts revealing Kungys' participation in wartime atrocities, the
Court was to add yet another chapter to those on materiality and
denaturalization.
A.

The Court's Opinion

If one adopts, however provisionally, Ronald Dworkin's notion that
judges who interpret statutes are like authors of a chain novel,7 3 the
Chaunt Court faced a daunting task. Taken together, extant cases provided little guidance and coherence, often seemingly driven by the per65. Id. at 1116.
66. Id. at 1117.
67. Id. at 1114.
68. Id. at 1123, 1132.
69. Id. at 1123.
70. Id. at 1132-33.
71. Id. at 1144.
72. United States v. Kungys, 793 F.2d 516 (3d Cir. 1986).
73. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 313 (1986). See also, RONALD DWORKIN, Law as
Interpretation, 60 TEX. L. REV. 527, 541-43 (1982).
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ceived moral, rather than legal, status of the defendants. 4 However,
the composition of the Court has changed since 1981, when Fedorenko
was decided. Antonin Scalia, a new member of the Court and a major
proponent of the textual approach to statutory interpretation, tackled in
Kungys751 the problems posed by Chaunt.
Quickly dispelling any notion that he would join the wearisome debate on the meaning of Chaunt, Justice Scalia virtually repudiated it.
Turning to the difficulties of working with Chaunt, he concluded that
"[w]ith the wisdom of experience, we now conclude that the attempts
to construct a standard from the Chaunt dicta have been both unnecessary and unfortunate.""6 Thus, rather than embellishing Chaunt, Justice Scalia placed the term "material" in a larger legal context, implicitly positing a coherence in legal usage that some may doubt.
Refusing to confine the discussion to the immigration statute, Scalia
ranged farther afield, noting the use of the term throughout AngloAmerican legal history. Tracing the law of false testimony to the days
of Lord Coke, he noted that materiality had always denoted something
of importance, something that had a "'natural tendency to influence,
or was capable of influencing, the decision of' the decision-making body
to which it was addressed." ' 77 Perjury statutes were particularly persuasive for Scalia since they seemed to represent the same type of statute
as section 340(a) of the INA. Both penalized someone for speaking
falsely on an important issue. Accordingly, Scalia noted that "[w]hile
we have before us here a statute revoking citizenship rather than imposing criminal fine or imprisonment, neither the evident objective
sought to be achieved by the materiality requirement, nor the gravity
of the consequences that follow from its being met, are so different as
to justify adoption of a different standard. 7 8
For Scalia and the four Justices who joined him in this part of the
opinion, 9 concealment or misrepresentations were material if they had
a natural tendency to influence the decisions of the INS.8 0 According to
Scalia, "the test more specifically is whether the misrepresentations or
74. Compare Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265 (1961) with Chaunt v. United States,
364 U.S. 350 (1960). As noted earlier, the Costello Court did not seem to follow any law in
affirming Costello's denaturalization. See, e.g., supra note 24. In Fedorenko v. United States,
Justice White expressed alarm at the incentives to lie which the statute presented. 449 U.S. 490
(1981). Yet, faithful to the law, he chose not to vote to affirm the denaturalization. Other members of the Court found the case a great deal less troubling.
75. See, e.g., Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452
(1987)(Scalia, J., concurring).
76. Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 769 (1988).
77. Id. at 770 (citing United States v. Corsino, 812 F.2d 26, 30-31 (1st Cir. 1987)); see also
Weinstock v. United States, 231 F.2d 699, 701-02 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
78. Kungys, 485 U.S. at 770.
79. Justices Brennan, O'Connor, White, and Chief Justice Rehnquist joined Justice Scalia in
this part of the opinion.
80. Kungys, 485 U.S. at 772.
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concealment had a natural tendency to produce the conclusion that the
applicant was qualified.""1 Moreover, the misrepresentations or concealment must be made at the time of naturalization. Thus, the government cannot rely on any suspicion aroused by discrepancies between
what was said or sworn to at the visa and at the naturalization stages.8 2
The concealment or misrepresentations must have occurred at the naturalization phase; otherwise, it wasn't the "citizenship" that was procured by the deceitful conduct.
This approach is only superficially appealing. Scalia's positing of uniformity in the word "material" as cutting across all statutes and contexts throughout time seems plainly counter-intuitive. It seems more
likely that beleaguered members of Congress, anxious to rewrite the
prior fraud section of the act,8 3 might use a convenient, though imprecise, term such as "material." Scalia's very assumptions rest on notions
of legislative drafting and usage that are probably belied by reality.
Thus, he exalted the ultimate weasel word, the ultimate chameleon,
"material," permitting it to take on any meaning, depending upon the
beliefs of the decision-maker.
Prior decisions, especially Chaunt, had sought to give "material" a
determinate meaning and content.8 4 Implicitly, those decisions subscribed to the notion of a symmetry between naturalization and denaturalization by which the subject of a denaturalization action must have
failed to meet the standards for naturalization. Here, Scalia failed to
enunciate a substantive standard, choosing, instead, to give the word its
evidentiary meaning: that which is "important." Thus, the Court has
rendered the word an empty vessel, bereft of fixed meaning and offering little guidance to anyone.
Justice Scalia thought that he had given "material" its appropriate
meaning. Thus, he asserted that materiality is a question of law and
proceeded to decide this legal question for the Court. Necessarily, he
insisted that materiality does have a meaning, one which he proceeded
to apply. Significantly, he commanded only two votes from his colleagues in this section of the opinion, the votes of Justices Rehnquist
and Brennan. Here, his foundation seemed least secure.
Turning to the ultimate question, Justice Scalia concluded that
Kungys' lies about his date and place of birth were immaterial within
the meaning articulated by the Court. Scalia noted that:
81. Id. at 771-2.
82. Id. at 775-6.
83. See INA of 1940, ch. 876, § 338, 54 Stat. 1158 (repealed 1952). Under that section,
naturalization could be revoked "on the ground of fraud or on the ground that such order and

certificate of naturalization were illegally procured." Id.
84. That is so regardless of which view of Chaunt is adopted. However interpreted, Chaunt
and its progeny focus on qualifications for citizenship; that is, whether the applicant was substantively qualified.
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There has been no suggestion that those facts were themselves relevant to his qualifications for citizenship. Even though they were
not, the misrepresentations of them would have a natural tendency
to influence the citizenship determination, and thus be a misrepresentation of material facts, if the true date and place of birth
could predictably have disclosed other facts relevant to his qualifications. But not even that has been found here.85
Here, Scalia seems to be repudiating Chaunt, and this may disturb
many. Admittedly, one's date and place of birth may be innocuous
facts from the perspective of the denaturalization court. However, had
the truth been disclosed at the naturalization phase, an investigation
might have revealed severely damning facts about one's participation in
war crimes which would have otherwise been concealed by lies about
one's origin. Thus, wandering vaguely between the now-discredited
Chaunt standard and utter confusion, Scalia erected a presumption8" of
disqualification. Accordingly, a person who "obtained his citizenship in
a proceeding where he made material misrepresentations was presumably disqualified."8 7 The citizen, thus, bears the burden of refuting this
presumption "by showing through a preponderance of the evidence,
that the statutory requirement as to which the misrepresentation had a
natural tendency to produce a favorable decision was in fact met." 88
Although Scalia's presumptive disqualification standard seemed to
effect an adequate balance by failing to reward the successful prevaricator, it, nonetheless, failed to establish either what was material or
what the citizen had to refute after the burden had shifted. Thus, Justice Scalia was on a high wire without a net. Refusing to accede to the
view that the government must prove ineligibility, Scalia seemingly
moved between statutory analysis and moral posturing. Not surprisingly, Scalia disagrees.
Since denaturalization may take place if either citizenship was procured illegally, or was procured by concealment or misrepresentation,
Scalia found the concealment or misrepresentations significant in and
of themselves. For him, such conduct served as a partial basis for denaturalization, notwithstanding the ultimate facts themselves. Thus, an
adoption of Justice Stevens' view that ineligibility must be proven,
would amount to a violation of the "cardinal rule of statutory interpretation that no provision should be construed to be entirely redundant." 89 A rule to the contrary would render the concealment or misrepresentation unnecessary; illegal procurement would now suffice.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Kungys, 485 U.S. at 774.
See Hennes, Comment, supra note 17, at 601.
Kungys, 485 U.S. at 777.
Id.
Id. at 778.
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Therefore, one may be stripped of citizenship, at least in part, because
of the lying itself. Scalia staunchly defended this position by refusing to
recognize the possibility that the statute was indeed redundant.
Justice Scalia was fearful that the effective liar could successfully
defeat denaturalization. Said Scalia,
[W]orse than making an enigma of the statute, Justice Stevens'
concurrence's position makes a scandal of the results the statute
achieves: Proof that an applicant lied when he said he was not an
SS officer at Dachau would not suffice for denaturalization without clear, unequivocal, and convincing proof-after 40 years of
disappearing evidence-that he was guilty of war crimes.9
However, in resisting Stevens' view, Justice Scalia refused to recognize that, in reality, all of INA section 340(a) condemns the citizen
who procured that status illegally. 91 Focusing on the language without
reference to statutory purpose, Scalia strove for a statutory coherence
on a purely verbal level and attempted to give independent significance
to every term used. Yet, properly viewed, misrepresentation and concealment are but two ways of procuring citizenship illegally, thus constituting a subset of illegal procurement. However, because of his commitment to pure textualism, Scalia refused to look beyond the verbal
confines of the statute. Ironically, by pursuing this track, he only supplanted substantive confusion with evidentiary chaos-and substantive
confusion.
On a concrete level, one wonders just what government proofs would
create this rebuttable presumption of ineligibility, and what burden the
citizen must shoulder to prove the opposite. This tension only grew
when the Court considered the issue of denaturalization and good
moral character. Indeed, this tension often reflects the complete chaos
of the statute and attempts by others, including the Court's, to resolve
that situation.
This discussion may be academic or futile, for the government may
now seek denaturalization through a very different means. Good moral
character is a requirement for citizenship. 92 A naturalization applicant
who falsely testifies, lacks good moral character.9 3 Therefore, quite logically, citizenship procured through the use of false testimony is revocable because it was illegally procured. The Kungys Court agreed. Hav90. Id. at 779. This sentence itself is an enigma, for proof that someone was an "SS" officer
would provide a basis for denaturalization and deportation under Fedorenko v. United States. 449
U.S. 490 (1981).
91. INA § 316(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a)(3), amended by Act of Dec. 29, 1981, Pub. L. No.
97-116, § 14, 95 Stat. 1161 and Immigration Act 1990, Act of Nov. 29, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101649, §§ 402 and 407(c)-(e), 104 Stat. 4978.
92. INA § 101(0(6), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(0(6) (1991).
93. INA § 101(0(6), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(0(6) (1991).
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ing asked the parties to address the question of whether false testimony
had to have been related to a material issue, the Court decided that it
did not. Referring to section 101(f)(6) of the INA,94 the Court concluded that "[iliterally read, it denominates a person to be of bad
moral character on account of having given false testimony if he has
told even the most immaterial of lies with the subjective intent of obtaining immigration or naturalization benefits. We think it means precisely what it says."9 5
Justice Scalia thought that a strict application of section 101(f)(6)
would cause little hardship, since three conditions must be met before
citizenship is revocable because of illegal procurement. First, the false
testimony is limited to oral statements made under oath.9" Second, revocation based on illegal procurement applies only to misrepresentations97
made with the subjective intent of obtaining immigration benefits.
Third, this section applies only to misrepresentations, not concealment. 98 Thus, "[w]ith all these built-in limitations, and given the evident purpose of the provision ... [,the Court saw] no reason for straining to avoid its natural meaning." 99 Though a logical parsing of these
statutes, the argument is unconvincing, 100 for the person who misrepresents an inconsequential fact-as was the case here-cannot be
denaturalized under section 340(a) alone, but may be denaturalized
through the operation of sections 340(a) and 101(f)(6) operating in
tandem.
Viewed in isolation, that seems unexceptional, for the sections cover
different territory. However, their commonality is pressing. Irrespective
of how cast, both avenues of denaturalization condemn the morally derelict citizen; each provides a penalty, though perhaps partial, for the
deceitful conduct itself. Yet, while one section requires materiality, the
other does not. Only through the application of a mechanical jurisprudence did the Court create or countenance this distressing anomaly. In
so doing, it avoided any reference to the -critical values possessed not
just by the naturalized citizen but firmly embedded in the very statute
which provided for loss of citizenship.
B.

Justice Stevens and Value-Oriented Jurisprudence
Because citizenship is important, its involuntary removal is deeply

94. Id.
95. Kungys, 485 U.S. at 779-80.
96. Id. at 780.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 781.
99. Id.
100. Perhaps because of the indeterminacy of these tests, the parties agreed to a consent judgment of denaturalization based on the government's agreement not to seek deportation. See 65
Interpreter Releases 1283, 1287-88 (Dec. 12, 1988).
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troubling. As Professor Aleinikoff said, "[w]hen the state strips an individual of her citizenship, it may well be tearing the self apart." 10 1
Mindful of that, Justice Stevens began his concurrence by reminding us
of the loss occasioned by denaturalization. Drawing his inspiration
from the public value of being free from grievous loss unless the government can unmistakably prove its case, Stevens concluded that "denaturalization is far too heavy a sanction to impose on an otherwise
innocent citizen for making false statements in 1948 and 1953. '"12 It is
a "punishment that is tantamount to exile or banishment [and is] patently excessive." '
Reasoning from a public values perspective, Stevens rejected all of
Scalia's conclusions, choosing, instead, to denaturalize only the miscreant who was ineligible for citizenship by having either concealed the
basis for ineligibility or by having falsely testified on a material issue.
Reasoning from criminal procedure analogies, he concluded that the
burden and burden shifting mechanism created by Scalia would never
be countenanced in a criminal context and should not be permitted
here. The fundamental difference between Scalia and Stevens, then, lay
in the visions they brought to statutory interpretation.
Justice Scalia strove mightily for a verbal coherence in the law that
harmonized the language within and between statutes, and other
sources of law. For him, language was the overriding, if not the sole,
master to be followed. He sought a horizontal coherence in the law in
which meaning was fixed, uniform, and determinate. Implicitly, he
ascribed this uniformity of usage-an almost divine circumspection and
consistency-to those who chose that language, the legislatures and
other sources of law. Language was determinate, and the task for the
judge is simply to interpret it properly, for surely it has been used that
way. Viewed thusly, Scalia is an intentionalist, 10 4 finding intention not
in legislative history, but in the written word itself that presumably
embodies those intentions.
This was not so for Justice Stevens. His mission was to vindicate the
values at stake in this fray. His analogies to criminal procedure precedent were telling, for he thought that denaturalization occasions a loss
as surely as does conviction. Moreover, Stevens believed that an interpretation that readily yielded denaturalization and invoked burden
shifting violated precious values. Thus, what for Justice Scalia was a
verbal coherence in the law, Stevens implicitly saw as short-sighted and
101. T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, Theories of Loss of Citizenship, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1471,
1495 (1986). Though Aleinikoff analyzed loss of citizenship from a communitarian perspective,
the harm of which he spoke exists regardless of one's theoretical inclinations.
102. Kungys, 485 U.S. at 791 (Stevens, J., concurring).
103. Id.
104. A term, perhaps used loosely here, to designate someone who feels the interpreter of
statutes should vindicate the intentions of their authors.
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as ignoring entirely the policies law seeks to promote.1" 5 While not ignoring the statutory language, Justice Stevens thought it should be
read to further larger goals and values, and not deified as an end in
itself.
Justice Stevens, in seeking a consonance of policy in law, implicitly
subscribes to the notion of a legal system. For him, law is not a
hodgepodge of various rules and principles extracted from a careful
parsing of language. Instead, it is a system built upon certain unifying
principles, presumably embodied in the language of statutory and decisional law. Conversely, Justice Scalia, who focused solely on internal
verbal consistency, implicitly rejected the notion of a legal system in
which seemingly disparate threads were but a part of a consistent
whole. Thus, unlike Scalia, Justice Stevens' coherence of policy envisions law as an enterprise with direction and purpose. The mission of
the judiciary is, therefore, to detect and vindicate these overarching
purposes. Here, Justice Stevens felt several values had been impermissibly trampled upon by the majority.
Two related values prominently emerge, though not discussed as
such by Justice Stevens. The first is the so-called rule of lenity. The
second is the principle of proportionality. By the first view, statutes,
especially criminal statutes, should be interpreted favorably to the individual, lest they visit an unwarranted hardship upon the accused. Thus,
0 6 the Supreme
for example, in United States v. Campos-Serrano,"
Court refused to allow an alien to be convicted for possession of a counterfeit entry document when he had possessed a counterfeit alien registration receipt card, or "green card."
The statute under which Campos-Serrano was prosecuted made it a
crime, among other things, to possess fraudulently any "document required for entry into the United States,' 10 7 after having listed various
forms of qualifying documents. Making the specious distinction between entry and re-entry documents, the Court concluded that this document did not fall within the coverage of the statute. Congress
promptly changed the law in the face of this nearly preposterous decision,1 0 8 but the case nonetheless provided a good example of a court
seeking an interpretation protective of the potentially unwitting. In
Kungys, Justice Stevens acted similarly in requiring more than a show105. Professor Eskridge has pointed to the necessity that law aspires to a "horizontal coherence of current policies," rather than a vertical coherence of a single policy backwards in time.
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REV. 67, 123 (1988).
He would undoubtedly agree that one should similarly eschew any attempt to erect a vision of law
as constituting a construct of verbal consistency to which we must unfailingly pay obedience.
106. 404 U.S. 293 (1971).
107. 18 U.S.C. § 1546 (West Supp. 1991).
108. The new statute expressly lists alien registration receipt card. 18 U.S.C. § 1546 (West
Supp. 1991).
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ing of moral distastefulness before a citizen could be stripped of citizenship. For him, policy was a surer and fairer guide than arid language. Though this can be regarded as anti-majoritarian, it is not.
Rather, Justice Scalia's vision posits legislative conduct that is plainly
counter-intuitive. At the very least, given the relative indeterminacy of
language, in Stevens' view, policy should trump forced literalism. In
fact, of course, judges constantly pour policy into statutes that are
facially unclear. Scalia's view is quixotic in its assumptions about the
determinacy of both language and judicial behavior.
Second, Justice Stevens' insistence on materiality being part of section 101(0(6) reveals a sensitivity to a principle of proportionality. All
"liars" do not stand on the same moral footing. It may be that one,
harried and fearful that some inconsequential fact may count against
her, would swear falsely about it. Yet, is she as bad as the person who
lies about something truly serious? Perhaps not, but the mechanical
application of the statute leads ineluctably to the conclusion that they
are the same, neither deserving to retain citizenship because both procured it illegally. In some sense, that may be faithful to these sections,
but it violates the view that the loss suffered should be commensurate
with one's blameworthiness, a view too entrenched in the law to require
citation to authority.
The INA is replete with provisions for forgiveness. 10 9 Thus, though
the denaturalization sections do not per se provide forgiveness, a
metapurpose of the statute is to allow people to retain their status so
long as their wrongdoing was within the the executive discretion contemplated by the INA." 0 A recent decision " of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA),"2 a tribunal which continuously deals with im109.
110.

INA §§101 et seq., 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101 et seq. (1988).
The INA contains numerous forms of relief including excludability and deportability.

INA §§ 101 et seq., 8 U.S.C. §l 101 et seq. (1988). Although most relief is discretionary, the
INA's very existence exhibits a pervasive theme of forgiveness. Moreover, the civil lawyer would
feel most comfortable discerning this overriding policy of forgiveness after having determined the
"equity" of the statute. See generally ARTHUR T. VON MEHREN & JAMES T. GORDLEY. THE CIVIL
LAW SYSTEM 81-82 (2d ed. 1977).
111. Matter of Hernandez-Casillas, A17-963-863 (BIA Jan. 11, 1990), rev'd, Matter of Hernandez-Casillas, Int. Dec. 3147 (AG Mar. 18, 1991) (unreported decision of the BIA). Although
the Attorney General reversed the BIA at the request of INS Commissioner, Gene McNary, the
Board's decision is still noteworthy for two reasons.
First, the BIA deals with immigration appeals on an ongoing basis, and its opinions are probably more reflective of public sentiment than those of the Attorney General, who only rarely exercises appellate jurisdiction. Second, although the Commissioner asked the Attorney General to
reconsider earlier precedent decisions of the BIA, he declined to do so. Thus, the earlier expansions of section 212(c) of the INA were left undisturbed.
Moreover, it may be noteworthy that the BIA's extension of section 212(c) to encompass entries
without inspection (EWI) would have had a potentially enormous impact on relief from deportation. That is so because EWI is by far the most common basis for deportation. See 1988 Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, Table 66, p. 119,
112. Although not specifically provided for by the INA, the BIA has appellate jurisdiction
over a vast array of immigration cases.
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migration law, underscores this policy.
Section 212(c) of the INA" 3 waives excludability for long-term residents who have become excludable since admission or who face exclusion upon seeking re-entry to this country. Its requirement of departure
and attempted re-entry was successfully challenged in Francis v. Immigration and NaturalizationService.'14 After Francis,the INS adopted
the position that section 212(c) waivers were also available to those
facing deportation who had not left the country. To be 'operational,
however, the basis for deportation must have had an analogue in the
exclusion section. That policy was effective until Matter of
Hernandez.115
Hernandez-Casillas, a long-time resident, was charged with entry
without inspection in 1985. As a basis for deportation, it has no analogue in the exclusion section of the INA. Remarkably, the BIA agreed
with him that relief should be available. Troubled that section 212(c)
could sometimes forgive a more serious offense while leaving the less
blameworthy alien without remedy, the BIA extended its ambit to
cover all but the most serious grounds for deportation. Thus, "given the
unusual history of section 212(c), and the long distance already traveled from the 'plain language' of that statute, it makes little sense now
to adhere to strict rules of statutory construction.""'
Hernandez was a major contribution to the chain novel of section
212(c) interpretation. The opinion preserved the spirit of forgiveness
that pervades the statute and maintained a coherence of policy to
which decision-makers should aspire. Justice Stevens acted in Kungys
in a manner similar to the BIA in Hernandez by relying on this useful
paradigm for statutory interpretation. Sometimes it is much easier to
follow the language of the statute. However, faced with linguistic indeterminacy, courts must look beyond the narrow, often unhelpful, confines of language to vindicate the larger policies of which the language
is only an imperfect reflection."'
C.

Through the Looking Glass
Setting aside the jurisprudential differences within the Court, one

113. INA § 212(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c), as amended by Immigration Act of 1990 § 601
(West Supp. 1991).
114. Francis v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 532 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1976).
115. Matter of Hernandez-Casillas, A17-963-863 (BIA Jan. 11, 1990), rev'd, Matter of Hernandez-Casillas, Int. Dec. 3147 (AG Mar. 18, 1991) (unreported decision of the BIA).
116. Id.
117. Professors Eskridge and Frickey attack the single-minded approach to interpretation,
characterizing it as "foundationalism." Instead, they recommend a recourse to practical reasoning
that deploys a variety of available interpretive tools. See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. &
PHILIP P. FRICKEY, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321
(1990).
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fact emerges which renders all of these cases somewhat surreal.
Though Justice Stevens' approach to linguistic indeterminacy is surely
more sound than Justice Scalia's, even he ignored a matter quite central to this dispute: the qualifications for citizenship themselves.
Throughout the cases discussed, courts have vaguely alluded to qualifications for citizenship, attempted to fashion appropriate tests, and applied those tests. Yet, despite this maundering prose, no Justice has
recognized just how little is required for an alien to acquire citizenship.
Accordingly, discussions of the various formulations of Chaunt and the
new test from Kungys are strangely empty. Debate has occurred in a
complete intellectual and factual vacuum.
The real screening for admission to the United States occurs when
someone first effects entry, ordinarily as a resident alien. The visa applicant must pass the thirty-four bases for admissability. 118 Having
done so, to become a citizen, she must satisfy certain objective tests,
such as lawful residency in the United States for a specified period of
time and continuous residency in the state of application for a particular period."' Beyond that, she must have been a person of good moral
character for a specified period, and must not fall within a class of
people ineligible for citizenship, such as those who are presently communists.' 20 Then, so long as the applicant has basic literacy in English
and a grasp of American history and civics, 2 ' she is eligible for naturalization upon taking an oath of allegiance.
Incredibly, then, all members of the Court have completely ignored
how citizenship is achieved, while engaging in heated debate over the
meaning of materiality and its relationship to the qualifications for citizenship. Even more remarkably, Justice Scalia decided the materiality
issue in Kungys as a matter of law without making even passing reference to the real naturalization process. Indeed, he failed to demonstrate
any familiarity with naturalization law itself. Yet, having committed
himself to the finding that the concealment must have taken place at
the naturalization stage, 22 his concerns were limited to concealment or
118. INA § 212(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a), amended by Immigration Act of 1990 § 601 (West
Supp. 1991).
119: INA §§ 316(a)-(g), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1427(a)-(g), as amended by Act of Dec. 29, 1981, Pub.
L. No. 97-116, § 14, 95 Stat. 1161 and Immigration Act of 1990 §§ 402 and 407 (c)-(e) (West
Supp. 1991).
120. INA § 313, 8 U.S.C. § 1424 (West Supp. 1991). See also INA § 314, 8 U.S.C. § 1425
(West Supp. 1991) (ineligibility of deserters from armed forces); INA § 315, 8 U.S.C. § 1426
(West Supp. 1991)(alien relieved of service denied citizenship); INA § 318, 8 U.S.C. § 1429
(West Supp. 1991)(burden of proof and prerequisites for citizenship); INA § 101(f)(8), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101 (0(8) (West Supp. 1991)(good moral character necessary for citizenship).
121. INA § 312, 8 U.S.C. § 1423 (West Supp. 1991).
122. Kungys, 485 U.S. at 757-58. Arguing that the concealment provision only applied to the
acquisition of the certificate of naturalization, the Court stated that "[p] rocurement of other benefits, including visas, is not covered. Especially in light of this contrast with [INA]§ 1101(f)(6), we
are unpersuaded by the Government's argument that a misrepresentation in the visa proceeding
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misrepresentations which took place at that stage.
Thus, all of the moral posturing in these opinions is really quite
meaningless, for the naturalization process is virtually pro forma and
only a few meaningful concealments can possibly take place at that
stage. Seen in this manner, Kungys should add nothing to existing case
law on materiality, though its melange of opinions surely obscures this
fact.*Perhaps that is why the case "settled" on remand. Indeed, it may
be the ultimate irony that in trying to punish the willful prevaricator
and provide clarity in the face of confusion, Justice Scalia accomplished neither. Although he attributed independent significance to the
very act of concealment apart from what was concealed, he failed to
recognize the triviality of this move, and never assigned a separate
weight and significance to the dissembling itself. Failing in that alone,
the case is a doctrinal failure, for the Court devised standards without
realizing their real life applications.
VI.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Kungys court, confused and fragmented, finally settled on an
odd approach to the problems of the statute and achieved little. Yet
this approach, in struggling to prove the certainty and clarity of language, only revealed a muddled statute and produced a vain effort to
establish its meaning. Rather than furthering values and larger legislative purposes, the Court wrestled with language until it lost.
Ideally, legislative purpose, language, and policy will be congruent
and will cause few problems for courts. Given the inexactitude of language, legislative inertia, and changes in policy that cannot be matched
by legislative efforts, current policies must be vindicated by the courts,
lest they languish entirely. The Court failed here, but its failure should
be instructive. Courts should follow the example of judges like Justice
Stevens and thus further the ongoing. dialogue with legislatures,
thereby adding to the chain novel of legislative interpretation. However, in light of the failure in Kungys, Congress should act to fix this
statute. It acted to create criminal liability after the decision in Campos-Serrano,123 and it should act here to safeguard citizenship from
being lost too easily and create clear, sensible legal standards to guide
the decision-maker. However, this very assertion is ambiguous and in'procures' the naturalization because it obtains United States residence, which in turn is a prerequisite to naturalization." Id. at 777. This reasoning precludes any inquiry into the lawfulness of
the citizen's residence, despite the fact that lawful residence is a precondition to admission to
citizenship. To the extent that this reasoning is inconsistent with prior case law, this case must
control. See also Matter of Longstaff, 716 F.2d 1439 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1219
(1984) (discussion of the relationship between eligibility for naturalization and lawful admission
to permanent residence).
123. United States v. Campos-Serrano, 404 U.S. 293 (1971). See supra text accompanying
note 108.
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vites explanation.
The discourse on denaturalization has focused on two categories of
people, the morally undeserving and the objectively ineligible. Though
this distinction is frequently blurred, it is present nonetheless. This distinction should provide Congress with its organizing principle for the
much-needed amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act.
Indisputably, a polity may rightly establish its moral criteria for
membership. Since we act as a people politically, we may insist that
new members possess certain moral traits before being permitted to
join in the national process of self-definition and self-determination.
The two statutory elements relevant to this process of selection of members (and, therefore, denaturalization) are good moral character and
concealment or misrepresentation.
Congress must decide whether a violation of section 101(f)(6) of the
INA automatically disqualifies someone for citizenship and is, therefore, a basis for the revocation of citizenship. Arguably, Justice Scalia
was correct in that the absence of good moral character, as evidenced
by false swearing, renders citizenship illegally procured. However, it is
not at all clear whether Congress foresaw this possibility, or, at least,
carefully considered the implications of illegal procurement providing
this avenue to denaturalization. It must be considered now, and Congress must decide whether all lying disqualifies for denaturalization
purposes, or whether only the more serious lies count. Thus, Congress
must decide whether materiality is an element of section 101 (f)(6) and,
if so, it must carefully define that term for these purposes.
Assuming Congress retains the basic scheme, it must decide what
weight, if any, to assign to the conduct of the concealment or misrepresentation. There is little doubt about Justice Scalia's purity of linguistic
analysis. Fortunately, he did not have to confront the issue of just how
much the dissembling counts against the naturalized citizen. While he
accused Justice Stevens of having rendered the statute a scandal, unless
Congress decides just what deceptions count against the citizen and
how heavily the conduct itself weighs against her, there will continue to
be a standardless statute with most pernicious consequences.
Once Congress has resolved these matters of moral qualifications, it
must decide on the relationship between qualifications for citizenship
it must address that old bugaboo of maand denaturalization. That is,
teriality and decide whether only the material concealment or misrepresentation counts against the citizen. However, if Congress properly
addresses the moral issues, this matter may virtually take care of itself.
Unless Congress accedes to the view that the passage of time and the
attenuation of evidence should burden the citizen, presumably only the
citizen who lacked the objective qualifications for citizenship can be
denaturalized. Thus, if one removes the unfortunate baggage that has
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burdened the law of denaturalization, only the unqualified citizen can
be denaturalized, and that decision is made by simply parsing the requirements for citizenship themselves.
Finally, if it seems harsh to denaturalize someone based on such a
mechanistic model, perhaps Congress should insert a provision which
forgives some forms of ineligibility. As mentioned earlier, forgiveness is
a pervasive theme of the INA, and perhaps it should, under appropriate circumstances, play some role here. It may well be that the loss of
citizenship is simply too disabling a hardship to visit upon the citizen of
long standing.
Although commentators have argued against the significance of citizenship, 124 under current law it is important. No doubt, the spectacle of
the person without a country is deeply troubling.12 5 Since statelessness
is so thoroughly abhorrent, citizenship must receive the protection it
deserves. Confronted by statutory silence on critical issues, the Supreme Court has imposed a rational construct which is a disservice to
both linguistic theory and value-based jurisprudence alike. Congress
must act to restore citizenship to its proper place in the American value
system.

124. For a commentary on the constitutional aspects of citizenship, see supra notes 1-3.
125. Unquestionably, Kungys suffers just that fate, for he cannot safely return to the Soviet
Union. Therefore, he has no citizenship.
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